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Abstract
Human and non-human animals tend to avoid risky prospects. If such 
patterns of economic choice are adaptive, risk preferences should reflect 
the typical decision-making environments faced by organisms. How-
ever, this approach has not been widely used to examine the risk sen-
sitivity in closely related species with different ecologies. Here, we ex-
perimentally examined risk-sensitive behavior in chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus), closely related species whose 
distinct ecologies are thought to be the major selective force shaping 
their unique behavioral repertoires. Because chimpanzees exploit riskier 
food sources in the wild, we predicted that they would exhibit greater 
tolerance for risk in choices about food. Results confirmed this predic-
tion: chimpanzees significantly preferred the risky option, whereas 
bonobos preferred the fixed option. These results provide a relatively 
rare example of risk-prone behavior in the context of gains and show 
how ecological pressures can sculpt economic decision making.
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1. Introduction
Animals face risk on a daily basis in contexts ranging from 
food acquisition to predator avoidance; thus, natural selection 
probably favors decision mechanisms that cope with this fea-
ture of the environment. Numerous studies have established 
that humans are generally risk averse for gains (preferring 
a safer option to a risky one) and risk seeking (risk prone) for 
losses (preferring a risky option to a safe one; Tversky & Kahn-
eman 1981). A wide variety of studies (Kacelnik & Bateson 
1996) indicate that non-human animals show similar patterns 
of risk sensitivity: species of insects, birds and mammals range 
from risk neutral to risk averse when making decisions about 
amounts of food, but are risk seeking towards delays in receiv-
ing food. Such strong phylogenetic continuity in economic pref-
erences suggests that these strategies obey a “common fun-
damental principle” across taxa (Marsh & Kacelnik 2002), 
representing a generally adaptive strategy for foraging animals.
Animal risk preferences are certainly not, however, invari-
ant—they shift under altered energy budgets and food avail-
ability (Caraco 1981; Gilby & Wrangham 2007), as well as 
when the riskier option is not particularly costly to acquire 
(Hayden & Platt 2007). This variability implies that animals 
may adaptively adjust their strategies to local environmental 
conditions, making ‘ecologically rational’ decisions (Gigeren-
zer et al. 1999). Furthermore, previous studies (Platt et al. 1996; 
Stevens et al. 2005a,b) have suggested a relationship between 
foraging ecology and specific cognitive mechanisms. Nonethe-
less, we currently have little understanding of whether many 
of the observed inter-species differences in risk preferences re-
flect differences in task demands (Macphail 1982), or whether 
they vary in predictable ways according to species-specific 
ecological conditions (Harvey & Clutton-Brock 1985). Here, 
we test the hypothesis that feeding ecology has shaped risk 
preferences in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan 
paniscus). Chimpanzees and bonobos are closely related phylo-
genetically, yet they differ in fundamental ways in their social 
and foraging behaviors.
Chimpanzees and bonobos diverged from a common an-
cestor less than one million years ago (Won & Hey 2005). They 
share many morphological and behavioral characteristics, in-
cluding body size and appearance, complex multi-male, multi-
female societies, and male philopatry (Kano 1992). However, 
the current research suggests that chimpanzees and bonobos 
exhibit large differences in dominance structure, sexual behav-
ior and aggression (Wrangham & Peterson 1996; but see Stan-
ford 1998). As the two species live in geographically distinct 
areas (Kano 1992; Boesch et al. 2002), feeding ecology has been 
proposed as the major selective force driving these social dif-
ferences (Wrangham & Pilbeam 2001). Although chimpanzees 
and bonobos both feed heavily on fruit and engage in ground 
feeding on terrestrial vegetation, bonobos may rely more 
heavily than chimpanzees on terrestrial herbaceous vegeta-
tion, a more temporally and spatially consistent food source 
(Wrangham & Peterson 1996). In doing so, bonobos may avoid 
some of the risk incurred by chimpanzees in their frugivorous 
foraging. Bonobos may also have access to larger fruit patches, 
facing less competition within a given patch than chimpanzees 
(White & Wrangham 1988), potentially turning fruit patches 
into safer options as well. Furthermore, chimpanzees, unlike 
bonobos, hunt monkeys, requiring the investment of exten-
sive time into a risky outcome (Gilby & Wrangham 2007). If a 
group of chimpanzees captures a monkey, the pay-off is high: 
colobus meat is rich in calories. Thus, hunting probably repre-
sents a risky strategy for chimpanzees.
Given that chimpanzees probably cope with more uncer-
tain food sources in their natural environments, we predicted 
that they would be more risk prone than bonobos in an experi-
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mental test of their risk preferences over food. Subjects made a 
series of choices between one option that always yielded four 
pieces of food, and another that yielded one piece or seven 
pieces with equal probability. The expected values of the two 
options were equivalent, so departures from indifference indi-
cate sensitivity to risk.
2. Material and Methods
We tested five chimpanzees (three males) and five bonobos (three 
males) at the Wolfgang Koehler Primate Research Center at the Leipzig 
Zoo, Germany. Subjects were socially housed by species in similar en-
closures. All subjects were born in captivity, were never food deprived, 
had previously participated in cognitive experiments and had ad libi-
tum access to water (including during testing). All subjects received reg-
ular daily feedings of fruits, vegetables and roots, and a weekly feeding 
of cooked meat, a regimen that was not altered during the testing pe-
riod (electronic supplementary material and Table 1).
Subjects experienced three trial types: choice trials, introductory 
trials and number-discrimination trials. In choice trials, subjects freely 
chose between the safe and the risky options. In introductory (forced-
choice) trials, only one option was present, familiarizing subjects with 
the reward contingencies. In number-discrimination trials, subjects 
saw the reward they would receive from both options before making 
the choice (electronic supplementary material).
Subjects chose between two upside-down bowls that differed in 
color and shape (Figure 1). The safe bowl always covered four grape 
halves, and the risky bowl covered one or seven pieces with equal 
probability; that is, the risky option covered one piece and seven 
pieces for equal numbers of trials within each session. Subjects made 
choices by sliding a Plexiglas barrier to one side, giving them access to 
the options (supplementary material).
After completing number-discrimination and introductory tri-
als, subjects completed six mixed-trial sessions, each consisting of 10 
choice trials, four introductory trials and eight number-discrimination 
trials presented in random order. Subjects then completed three final 
sessions with 20 choice trials each (supplementary material).
3. Results
In choices between a fixed and a risky reward option (using 
choice trials from all sessions), chimpanzees were risk seeking 
(mean ± s.e. proportion choosing fixed option, 0.36 ± 0.04), sig-
nificantly preferring the risky reward (t(4) = −3.48, p = 0.025 
one sample t-test, all reported comparisons are two-tailed). In 
contrast, bonobos were risk averse (0.72 ± 0.03), preferring the 






























were more risk seeking than bonobos (t(8) = −6.79, p < 0.001, in-
dependent samples t-test; Figure 2), and binomial tests on indi-
viduals’ choices revealed that four out of the five chimpanzees 
exhibited risk proneness, and all bonobos exhibited risk aver-
sion (Table 1). The risk preferences exhibited by chimpanzees 
and bonobos were non-overlapping. There was no effect of sex 
(p = 0.37) or age (p = 0.82) on risk preferences (Table 1).
A number of alternative explanations could account for 
these differences. To address differences in learning abili-
ties (the species might have eventually converged on similar 
preferences), we split the nine sessions into three blocks. A re-
peated-measures ANOVA with session block as a within-sub-
jects factor and species as a between-subjects factor showed no 
effect of block (F1,8 = 1.11, p = 0.32). Further, a trend for an in-
teraction between species and block (F1,8 = 4.56, p = 0.065) sug-
Figure 1. Apparatus. Chimpanzees and bonobos chose between fixed 
and risky rewards hidden under bowls.
Figure 2. Patterns of risk preferences in apes, across session blocks. Er-
ror bars represent standard error. Chimpanzees (black bars) were risk 
seeking, whereas bonobos (slashed bars) were risk averse. Chimpan-
zees became slightly more risk seeking as sessions progressed. 
Table 1. Individual risk preferences and subject histories. 
(Chimpanzees were risk seeking, while bonobos were risk 
averse. The two distributions did not overlap. Asterisk indi-
cates statistical significance.)
Subject   Proportion        p-value           sex      age 
              fixed choices                                  (years)
chimpanzees
Fro  0.27  <0.001*  M  12
Pat  0.29  <0.001*  M  8
Pia  0.40  0.035*  F  6
Rob  0.35  =0.001*  M  30
San  0.49  0.79  F  12
bonobos
Joe  0.69  <0.001*  M  24
Kun  0.71  <0.001*  M  9
Lim  0.63  0.008*  M  10
Uli  0.84  <0.001*  F  12
Yas  0.72  <0.001*  F  8
248 hei lbr o n n e r e t al. i n Bi o l og y let te r s  4 (2008) 
gests that the species’ preferences diverged with experience 
rather than converged (Figure 2).
Divergent risk preferences may have stemmed from differ-
ences in numerical competence. However, both species were 
highly successful at choosing the larger reward in the number-
discrimination trials dispersed throughout experimental ses-
sions (mean ± s.e. proportion correct, chimpanzees, 0.95 ± 0.01; 
bonobos, 0.94 ± 0.02; t(8) = 0.38; p = 0.71), suggesting that both 
species could discriminate the options and were motivated to 
acquire the larger rewards.
4. Discussion
The chimpanzees and bonobos tested here used disparate 
strategies when confronted with decisions about risk: chim-
panzees preferred risky options and bonobos preferred safe 
options, an effect that was present in nearly every individ-
ual. This difference is notable given that the two species share 
similar general anatomy and life histories. Our results suggest 
that species-specific feeding ecologies can strongly influence 
risk preferences. When compared with bonobos, chimpanzees 
face riskier foraging situations in their natural habitat and may 
have therefore evolved more risk-prone decision rules. Note 
that, although not identical, housing and feeding for the two 
groups were similar, reducing the likelihood that the observed 
difference results from these factors. Indeed, the divergent risk 
preferences of these two species is all the more striking given 
that they are captive animals housed under similar conditions, 
suggesting that differences result from evolved decision-mak-
ing strategies and not prior experience (Burke & Fulham 2003). 
Nonetheless, although there is substantial overlap in the living 
conditions and testing environments of our target species, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that these results are due to the 
experiences, cultures and conditions of the two specific groups 
tested here.
The risk-seeking behavior exhibited by chimpanzees is 
rarely observed among animals and is likely to be maladap-
tive in many environments. A forager who reflexively chooses 
risky options may lose too many gambles to successfully sur-
vive. Consequently, the most commonly observed range of 
risk preferences over gains is indifference or aversion (Kacel-
nik & Bateson 1996). The chimpanzee strategy, while gener-
ally risk prone, may be context specific, lending them flexibil-
ity in dealing with their environment. Chimpanzees do show 
context-specific risk-seeking behavior by engaging in hunting 
more often when fruit is plentiful than when it is scarce (Gilby 
& Wrangham 2007). Overall, the chimpanzees’ behavior dem-
onstrates that risk proneness may be a more common strategy 
than usually acknowledged.
Chimpanzee and bonobo risk-sensitive strategies also map 
directly on to their decisions about delayed rewards. Rosati et 
al. (2007) assessed these apes’ temporal preferences by offer-
ing subjects’ choices between smaller, immediate rewards and 
larger, delayed rewards. Chimpanzees waited significantly 
longer than bonobos for the larger rewards. This is particu-
larly relevant for studies of risk because organisms may per-
ceive delayed rewards as risky. Any number of interruptions 
could affect the outcome of a future reward, associating the 
risk-seeking preferences with a preference for a delayed re-
ward. Indeed, our results indicate that the more patient chim-
panzees are also more risk prone than bonobos, suggesting 
that they may wait longer for a delayed reward because they 
are more willing to incur its associated risk.
Altogether, these findings support growing evidence that 
decision-making environments shape economic preferences. 
Though humans systematically violate many of the normative 
principles of economic theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1981), 
few researchers have considered preferences in relation to 
the environment in which they evolved (but see Gigerenzer et 
al. 1999). As humans did not evolve in the context of modern 
economies, many of our preferences are probably tailored to 
providing adaptive foraging and other evolutionarily relevant 
decisions. An evolutionary approach to economic preferences 
can therefore offer keen insights into the nature of human and 
animal decision making.
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We tested five bonobos (three males: Kuno, Limbuko, and 
Joey; two females: Yasa, Ulindi) and five Western common 
chimpanzees (three males: Patrick, Robert, and Frodo; two 
females: Sandra and Pia). While subjects were not perfectly 
matched in age, there was no systematic age difference be-
tween the two groups (see Table 1). 
Chimpanzee subjects were all part of a 17-member so-
cial group, one of two separately housed chimpanzee groups 
at the zoo. Bonobo subjects were all part of a six-member so-
cial group (the sixth, untested bonobo is an infant female). 
During the day, each group had access to both a smaller, in-
door enclosure and a larger, outdoor enclosure, subject to the 
time and the weather. At night, they slept in group-specific in-
door rooms, and both species made the transfer into and out 
of this room at approximately the same time. Chimpanzee and 
bonobo subjects both experienced regular enrichment, includ-
ing foraging-specific enrichment. All had unrestricted access 
to water, even during testing. Subjects were tested between 
the hours of 08:30 and 12:30, with no subject’s testing locked 
to a particular time within that frame. All subjects were born 
in captivity, were never food-deprived, and could stop partic-
ipating at any time. While housing and rearing conditions for 
the two species were certainly not identical, they were quite 
similar, and were certainly much more alike than those expe-
rienced by these animals in the wild. In particular, the feeding 
regimens (highly relevant to these food-based choice tasks) for 
the two groups were essentially the same. Thus, observed dif-
ferences between the two groups are much more likely to be 
due to their evolutionary histories than differences in housing, 
although the latter is still a distinct possibility.
Apparatus
Subjects faced the experimenter through a Plexiglas panel 
with holes on either side through which subjects could reach 
to make choices by sliding a small Plexiglas barrier (60 cm long 
and 9 cm tall) to one side, uncovering the hole in front of that 
bowl. This barrier was used to prevent subjects from choos-
ing both options, as sliding the barrier to one side blocked the 
opposite hole. Food rewards were placed on a plastic 73 cm × 
33 cm table attachment. Rewards were obscured by plastic col-
ored bowls (diameter = 26 cm, height = 12 cm) and a 70 cm × 
27 cm × 23 cm occluder. This occluder was used to cover the 
bowls during baiting to ensure that subjects did not know how 
many items were available beneath the risky option. During 
sessions, the experimenter placed the options on a table (73 cm 
x 33 cm) that could be slid forward within the subject’s reach. 
The side assignments for the options were counterbalanced 
within sessions. 
Trial Structures
Both chimpanzees and bonobos chose between a safe re-
ward (associated with a particular bowl shape and color) that 
always yielded four grape halves and a risky reward (under 
the other colored bowl) that yielded seven grape halves 50% of 
the time and one grape half the other 50% of trials. For all trial 
types, the inter-trial interval (time between end of one trial 
and beginning of another) was set at approximately 25 s. Dur-
ing the inter-trial interval, the experimenter loaded the table 
with the appropriate food rewards and covered each side with 
a colored bowl. We counterbalanced the assignment of bowl 
color to option type (fixed versus risky) across subjects. All 
loading occurred behind an occluder. Reward options were 
randomized across trials. The experimenter always loaded the 
rewards from left to right, in case subjects attempted to infer 
amounts from body placement. At the end of the inter-trial in-
terval, the trial began when the occluder was lifted. In choice 
trials, the subject then saw the two options for 4 s prior to mak-
ing a choice. In introductory trials, only one option was avail-
able to choose. In number-discrimination trials, subjects saw 
the actual reward quantities for 4 s before the experimenter 
then covered them with the appropriate bowls in view of the 
subject. When the 4 s had passed, the experimenter pushed the 
table forward to allow the subject to make a choice. The sub-
ject then had 15 s to make a choice by sliding the Plexiglas bar-
rier to one side. The experimenter then uncovered the food 
amount beneath the chosen bowl and handed it to the subject.
Discarding Data
If a subject did not make a choice (meaning did not slide 
the Plexiglas barrier to one side) within 15 s of being given ac-
cess to the barrier, the trial was considered aborted. Addition-
ally, if a subject failed to consume all the food, the trial was 
aborted. Aborted trials were appended to the end of the ses-
sion. However, upon three aborted trials in a single session, 
the entire session was ended and the data discarded. Only one 
session had to be aborted in this way.
Criteria were also established to eliminate severely side-bi-
ased data. For mixed sessions, if a subject chose a single side 
nine or more times out of ten possible choice trials in a single 
session, plus chose incorrectly toward the side of the bias on a 
single number trial, the data from that session was discarded 
and the session repeated. For the later, choice sessions, if a 
subject chose a particular side on 18 out of 20 trials or more, 
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that data was discarded and the session repeated. Only a sin-
gle session was deemed biased based on these criteria, sug-
gesting that the apes found the task and the reward contingen-
cies highly salient.
Pretest Sessions
Prior to beginning the experimental sessions, all subjects 
completed two types of sessions: number-discrimination and 
introductory sessions. During the number-discrimination ses-
sion, there were 20 number-discrimination trials, 10 of each 
comparison type. In order to progress to the introductory ses-
sion, each subject had to choose the larger reward on 8 of 10 
trials for each comparison type. Subjects repeated number-dis-
crimination sessions until they reached this threshold. During 
the introductory session, subjects only had one possible option 
available to them. Of the 20 trials in an introductory session, 
10 presented the risky option (split between one and seven re-
wards) and the other 10 presented the fixed option. In order to 
proceed from the introductory session to the mixed sessions, 
subjects had to choose the side with a reward available on 19 
of 20 trials.
Results
A Shapiro-Wilks W test revealed that the data were not vi-
olating assumptions of normality, W = 0.952, p = 0.753 (chim-
panzees), W = 0.898, p = 0.399, bonobos. The Levene’s Test for 
Equality of Variances confirmed that the two data sets were 
sufficiently homogeneous, p = 0.56. 
To determine whether this pattern could be attributed to 
species or individual differences in numerical discrimination, 
subjects also completed number-discrimination choices over 
the relevant quantities. Chimpanzees and bonobos did not dif-
fer in the number of sessions it took to reach criterion for dis-
crimination, t(8) = 0.426, p = 0.68 (Levene’s Test: p = 0.53), or 
on their overall performance on the number-discrimination 
trials dispersed through the first six experimental sessions, t(8) 
= .381, p = .71 (Levene’s Test: p = .554). Furthermore, individ-
ual differences in number discrimination performance did not 
predict their risk preferences, r = -.013, p = 0.73, Pearson cor-
relation. One additional possibility is that the chimpanzees 
and bonobos differed in their motivation to acquire the food. 
Three pieces of evidence suggest that this is not the case. First, 
chimpanzees and bonobos received equal amounts of food in 
the task overall despite their different choice strategies. Sec-
ond, both species were highly successful at picking the larger 
reward on the number-discrimination trials, suggesting simi-
lar levels of engagement in the task. More importantly, if one 
of the species was unmotivated to acquire the food, then that 
species might have performed at chance in the choice trials 
due to lack of interest. Thus, differences in motivation can-
not account for the strong, but divergent, preferences that both 
species exhibited. 
The amount received from the risky reward in experimen-
tal choices could vary slightly from session to session and be-
tween individuals; however, on both an individual and group 
level, subjects did not receive the larger or smaller reward 
from the risky option more often than chance, t(9) = -1.37, p 
= 0.20 (group-level analysis). In addition, these variations did 
not affect subjects’ choices, r = 0.157, p = 0.67, and there was 
no difference between species in overall amount received, t(8) 
= -0.114, p = 0.89 (Levene’s Test: p = 0.23). This precludes the 
possibility that the observed differences resulted from differ-
ent reward amounts received rather than risk preferences.
An analysis of first-order transitions (run on the last three 
sessions only—this being the explicit reason for running the 
choice sessions) revealed that, on both individual and group 
levels, subjects were not more or less likely to switch to the 
fixed reward directly after receiving the small payoff from the 
risky reward than after receiving the large payoff, t(9) = 1.527, 
p = 0.161, two-tailed paired-samples t-test. 
